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Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Re:

Joel Sill v. Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction
Appellate Case No. 20050245-CA

Court:
Under cover of this letter, Appellee Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction, provides to the
Court a copy of the following case authority that is supplemental to those authorities cited in the
Brief of Appellee that is on file herein: Robert Pearson, d/b/a Robert Pearson Construction v.
Suzanne J. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383. This supplemental citation is provided now because it is a
ruling of this Court made after briefing in this case was completed.
The Pearson case pertains to two of the issues raised in the parties' briefs in this abovereferenced pending appeal. First, the argument of Appellant {e.g., Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-21)
that Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), the statute at issue both in this case and in the Pearson case,
is "mandatory" and therefore a "jurisdictional" bar to certain mechanics' lien claims. Pearson,
2005 UT App. 383 f17-12 (holding it is not "mandatory" or "jurisdictional"). Second, the
argument of Appellee (Brief of Appellee, pp. 30-32) that the district court's ruling that the statute
does not apply to this case in any event should be upheld as being in accord with the underlying
purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect those who provide labor and materials that add
value to the property of another. Pearson, 2005 UT App. 383fflJ8& 11 (noting and upholding that
policy).
Sincerely,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

- / • * &
Bradley >T Tilt
BLT/jd
Enclosure
cc: David B. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant, w/encl.

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Robert Pearson dba Robert
Pearson Construction,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20040613-CA
F I L E D
(September 9, 2005)

v.
Suzanne J. Lamb,

2005 UT App 383
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Silver Summit Department, 020500636
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck
Attorneys:

David B. Thompson, Park City, for Appellant
David M. Bennion and Michael P. Petrogeorge, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.
DAVIS, Judge:
^|l
Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals the trial court's denial
of her motion for a new trial, in which she argued that the
failure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply with Utah Code
section 38-1-11(4)(a) divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (a) (2001) . We affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2
In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
foreclosure of a mechanics' lien. Defendant filed her answer in
December 2002 and an amended answer and counterclaim in February
2003/ neither pleading contained allegations that Plaintiff
failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics' Liens
Act. On April 12, 2004, the parties filed stipulations of fact
with the district court, stipulating that
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the
statutory procedural requirements for
perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics'

lien . . . ; Mrs. Lamb does not defend
against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim
on these statutory procedural grounds, but
simply challenges his right to receive
payment of the amounts claimed in the lien.
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the district court entered
a memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004.
1)3
On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration (which she now dubs a motion for a new trial), in
which she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the foreclosure action because Plaintiff failed to comply with
the requirements of section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens
Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2004, issued a ruling and
order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on July 28,
2004, entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f4
The only issue before this court is whether Plaintiff's
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics'
Liens Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
Plaintiff's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. If Plaintiff's
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that Defendant
waived that issue, not only by failing to assert it prior to
trial but also by stipulation.
H5
The determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's
determination. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,1)8,
31 P. 3d 1147. Questions of statutory interpretation are
similarly questions of law that are reviewed "for correctness,
giving no deference to the district court's interpretation."
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1)8, 94 P.3d 234.
ANALYSIS
1)6
Under section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act,
lien claimants filing an action to enforce a lien must serve on
the defendant-owner of a residence instructions relating to the
owner's rights and a form affidavit along with the complaint.
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant to section
38-1-11 (4) (e), "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide to the
owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit
required by [sjubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred
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from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." Id.
§ 38-1-11(4) (e) . On appeal, Defendant argues that the language
of section 38-1-11(4)(e) makes subsection 4(a) "mandatory,"
thereby making it a jurisdictional provision that cannot be
waived and can be raised at any time. Defendant thus contends
that Plaintiff's failure to comply with requirements of section
38-1-11(4) (a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
Plaintiff's lien foreclosure action.
%1
Whether a procedure prescribed by statute is jurisdictional
depends on whether the procedure is "mandatory" or "directory."
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah
1996). And while a procedure is generally considered "mandatory"
when "consequences are attached to the failure to act," Stahl v.
Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980), the purpose of
the statute and the legislature's intent are of the utmost
importance:
There is no universal rule by which directory
provisions may, under all circumstances, be
distinguished from those which are mandatory.
The intention of the legislature, however,
should be controlling and no formalistic rule
of grammar or word form should stand in the
way of carrying out the legislative intent .
. . . The statute should be construed
according to its subject matter and the
purpose for which it was enacted.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706
(Utah 1978) (alterations in original) (quotations and citation
omitted); see also Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 ("A statute is, of
course, to be construed in light of its intended purposes.").
Therefore, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore
jurisdictional, if it is 'of the essence of the thing to be
done.'" Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other
quotations and citations omitted); see also Projects Unlimited,
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah
1990) ("We must determine whether the rigorous interpretations
urged by [defendants] are necessary to protect the interests of
the parties in the instant situation. Unless we find that
[Plaintiff's] alleged failures have compromised a purpose of the
mechanic[s'] lien statute, those failures will be viewed as
technical . . . .") .
if8
The Mechanics' Liens Act was passed primarily to protect
laborers who have added value to the property of another, but
also to protect the property owner's right to convey clear title:
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[T] he purpose of the mechanic [s'] lien act is
remedial in nature and seeks to provide
protection to laborers and materialmen who
have added directly to the value of the
property of another by their materials or
labor. On the other hand, we recognize that
liens create an encumbrance on property that
deprives the owner of his ability to convey
clear title and impairs his credit . . . .
State legislatures and courts attempt to
balance these competing interests through
their mechanic[s'] lien statutes and judicial
interpretations thereof.
Projects Unlimited. 798 P.2d at 743 (quotations and citations
omitted); see also Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563
(Utah 1989) ("[T] he mechanic[s'] lien law was enacted for the
benefit of those who perform the labor and supply the materials .
. . . ").
We must therefore balance a laborer's right to be paid
for his labor and materials with the negative impact that liens
have on an owner's credit and her ability to convey clear title.
Plaintiff's failure to serve Defendant with instructions and a
form affidavit is irrelevant to the lien's negative impact,
whereas invalidating Plaintiff's right to be paid for his labor
simply because he made a procedural error clearly contravenes the
intended purpose of the Mechanics' Liens Act. Quite simply, the
requirements of section 38-1-11(4) (a) have nothing to do with
"the essence of the thing to be done," Beaver County v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quotations and citations
omitted), and Plaintiff's failure to comply therewith did not
compromise a purpose of the Act.
f9
Furthermore, the procedures set forth in section 38-111(4)(a) are not "mandatory" because no consequences attach to
the failure to act. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481. The omission
could have been remedied at any time during the course of the
proceedings, or, had the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's
mechanics' lien foreclosure action for failure to adhere to
section 38-1-11(4) (a), the dismissal could have been easily
addressed by either refiling or, depending on the timing, through
Utah's savings statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2002).
Under Utah's savings statute,
[i]f any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, . . . [the plaintiff]
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may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure.
Id.
HlO Although Plaintiff may have failed to serve Defendant with
the instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-111(4)(a), there is no question that he commenced his action
within due time. "A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a
complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together
with a copy of the complaint." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). And
section 38-1-11(1) gives lien claimants twelve months after
completion of the contract, or 180 days after the lien claimant
last performed labor, to file suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-111(1). Here, Plaintiff performed labor at the residence
throughout the spring of 2002 and filed his complaint seeking
foreclosure in October 2002. Because Plaintiff's action was
timely commenced and a dismissal for failure to adhere to section
38-1-11(4)(a) would have been a dismissal "otherwise than upon
the merits," id. § 78-12-40, Plaintiff could have remedied his
failure simply by commencing a new action within one year after
the dismissal.
fll Unlike "mandatory" designations, "a designation is merely
directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with
a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the
business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to
those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Beaver County
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Kennecott
Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other quotations and citations
omitted); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744-50
(upholding a lien despite its errors because such errors were
technical and the defendant suffered no prejudice). Therefore,
Utah courts have held that certain procedures required by statute
are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. For example, in
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113,
the court determined that a mailing requirement of the Medical
Malpractice Act was not jurisdictional, stating that construing
the statute "in a manner to impose jurisdictional consequences on
a claimant's every procedural stumble is to misapprehend the
Medical Malpractice Act[]." I^L. at Hl4. While the court "[did]
not ignore the fact that the requirement . . . [was] mandatory,"
it stated that the mailing requirement was "a minor component of
the Malpractice Act's prelitigation scheme. It serve [d] a wholly
informational role, and it is difficult to envision how
[defendants] could be prejudiced by being deprived of [the
mailing] ." Id. at i[l7. And in Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah
156, 84 P.2d 782 (1938), the court interpreted a statute
requiring a plaintiff to file an undertaking, or bond, securing
costs contemporaneously with the complaint. The court held that
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the statute, while affording no discretion to the court, still
did not create a jurisdictional prerequisite:
The language of [the statute], while positive
and mandatory, when considered altogether
makes the requirement only that the
undertaking be filed contemporaneously with
the complaint. This certainly is no stronger
than the language of [other] statutes which
require the bond to be filed before
commencing action. But we think the
legislature intended to make the requirement
so positive and unequivocal as to require the
court to dismiss the suit if the bond was not
filed at least contemporaneously with the
complaint if fal motion to dismiss was timely
made. Otherwise, the court could continue to
take jurisdiction.
Id. at 784.'
i|l2 Like the statute construed in Kiesel, the requirements of
section 38-1-11(4) (a) are not conditions precedent to filing
suit; they simply require action contemporaneous with the filing
of the complaint. Furthermore, like the Medical Malpractice Act
construed in Labelle. the Mechanics' Liens Act creates numerous
procedural hurdles to enforcing a lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 381-7 (2001) (delineating the contents of a notice of lien, and the
time frame in which it must be filed); id. § 38-1-11(1), (2)
(delineating the time frame in which suit and a lis pendens must
be filed). Section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act
simply requires that certain instructions and a form affidavit be
served on the defendant; these requirements are "wholly
informational" and but "a minor component" of the Mechanics'
Liens Act. Labelle, 2004 UT 15 at Hl7. Finally, like the
1

Other jurisdictions have held that certain "mandatory"
procedures are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. See
Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting a statute that required a
contractor to provide a residence owner an affidavit prior to
bringing suit, the court stated that "[a]1though the furnishing
of the affidavit is a condition precedent to bringing an action
to foreclose a mechanic[s'] lien, failure to do so does not
create a jurisdictional defect"); Campbell v. Graham, 357 P.2d
366, 368 (Colo. 1960) (interpreting a statute that barred
businesses that had not filed trade name affidavits from
prosecuting suits, the court rejected the proposition that trade
name filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit).
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defendants in Labelle, it is difficult to envision how Defendant
here was prejudiced by being deprived of the instructions and
form affidavit required by section 38-1-11(4) (a). Defendant has
not alleged that she was prejudiced. In fact, she even
stipulated that she was not defending against the lien
foreclosure on statutory procedural grounds, but simply
"challenge[d] his right to receive payment of the amounts claimed
in the lien." Quite simply, the requirements of section 38-111(4)(a) are "directory, and therefore not jurisdictional," as
they merely concern "the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of
the business" and Defendant has suffered no prejudice. Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996)
(quotations and citation omitted).
i[l3 Defendant cites numerous cases involving the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act [UGIA], stating that the UGIA's notice
requirement is comparable to the requirements of section 38-111(4)(a). Such an analogy is erroneous, as the UGIA's notice
requirement has nothing whatsoever to do with service and mailing
but instead provides that a claim against the state is barred
unless notice thereof is filed with the state within one year
after the cause of action arises. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d402 (2004); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah
1980). In this way, the UGIA's notice requirement is far more
analogous to Utah Code section 38-1-11(1) and (2), which mandates
that a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and a lis pendens must
be filed within twelve months after completion of the contract or
180 days after the lien claimant last performed labor. See Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1), (2). And like a party's failure to
adhere to the UGIA's notice requirements, a party's failure to
timely file a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and lis pendens
is fatal and cannot be remedied:
The penalty for not commencing an action to
enforce a mechanic[s'] lien within the
twelve-month period provided in section 38-111 is invalidation of the lien . . . .
When
a claimant fails to file the lis pendens
within the twelve-month period, the lien
itself is not invalidated, but rather it is
rendered void as to everyone except those
named in the action and those with actual
knowledge of the action.
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798
P.2d 738, 751 n.13, 752 (Utah 1990). Utah courts have thus ruled
that failure to timely commence a mechanics' lien foreclosure
action and file a lis pendens, like failure to timely notify the
state of a claim against it, divests the court of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Interlake Distribs., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d

20040613-CA

7

1295, 1297-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that liens were void
because plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens)/ Diehl Lumber
Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
("Failure to commence a timely mechanic[s1] lien foreclosure
action divests the court of jurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co. v.
Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-91 (Utah 1986)
(holding that an untimely mechanics' lien action is a
jurisdictional issue and "forecloses [the parties'] rights").
fl4 Comparison between the requirements of section 38-1-11(4)(a)
and the UGIA is misplaced also because Utah courts have
specifically held that the UGIA is to be "strictly construed,"
Great W. Cas. Co. v. Utah Pep't of Transp., 2001 UT App 54,1)9, 21
P.3d 240, whereas "substantial compliance with the [Mechanics'
Liens Act] is all that is required," Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah
295, 215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950) (relating to the legal sufficiency
of the notice of lien); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at
743 ("Utah courts have recognized that substantial compliance
with [the Mechanics' Liens Act's] provisions is all that is
required."). "Although courts have differing opinions about how
liberally to construe provisions within their mechanic [s1] lien
statutes, the modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules
which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact pattern."
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quotations and citation
omitted). Here, Plaintiff substantially complied with the Act,
to such an extent that Defendant did not even notice Plaintiff's
oversight until May 2004, more than eighteen months after the
complaint was filed and more than one month after Defendant
stipulated that Plaintiff had "complied with all the statutory
procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a
mechanics' lien." Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the
instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-1-11 (a)
would have conferred any demonstrable value here, but instead
argued that such value (or lack thereof) was "irrelevant" and "of
no import." Therefore, Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section
38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
1(15 Since Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section 38-1-11 (4) (a)
did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, we affirm the
trial court's Final Order and Judgment in favor of, and its award
of reasonable attorney fees and costs below to, Plaintiff. See
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (awarding reasonable attorney
fees to the "successful party" in a mechanics' lien foreclosure
action). Because "[t]he general rule is that when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal," Utah Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App.
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1991), we remand the matter to the district court for calculation
of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
1|l6

Affirmed and remanded.

James Z. Davis, Judge

K17

I CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

ill8

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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